Jump to main content
IndustriALL logotype
Article placeholder image

In search of a common route

Read this article in:

13 March, 2002Learning more about the realities of Muslim societies, and of Arab societies in particular, is undoubtedly a crucial part of the struggle to achieve a new world order, writes Toni Ferigo, responsible for the Maghreb region in the IMF Secretariat.

BY TONI FERIGO Now that the application by the Algerian Metalworkers' Federation has been accepted, all the major unions representing the metalworkers of the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) are IMF affiliates. This is very important, particularly at present. International solidarity also means mutual understanding, and contact between different cultures. Leaving behind any easy stereotypes, exploring the cultural and political history of Arab societies in all their complexities, and even -- why not? -- acknowledging the mistakes and responsibilities of each actor, such efforts are the foundation upon which dialogue can be developed and common objectives can be identified. Arab nations are going through a very difficult time in their history. Most of the hopes fostered by the decolonisation process have been shattered, giving way to frustration, the stifling of civil society, and a bitter sense of resentment, often bursting out into violent extremism. The crucial role of civic organisations in these societies is testified by the history of the labour movement in Tunisia, which has always had a dialectical relationship -- and at times a conflict -- with the economic and political authorities of the country. To many observers, the Arab Muslim world seems almost self-entrenched, incapable of any serious modernisation, and torn apart by conflicting trends, either towards secularisation or towards radical fundamentalism. In this part of the world, globalisation seems to have been met only by identity-based resistance, all too hastily labelled as anti-modern. Furthermore, while the success of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre has been hailed by many as a sign of hope, the Arab world was not present at the Forum. At first sight, one would comment that this part of the world has hardly contributed at all to the struggle against neo-liberalism. Such views are one-sided and thwarted, but they are very widespread in the West, and we should wonder why. A clash of civilisations? After September 11th, I have had the opportunity to attend a great many debates on the relationship between the West and Islam, and I have met many Arab intellectuals and human rights activists, and many Muslim trade unionists. A question keeps coming up, again and again: "Why is the relationship between the West and Islam so often loaded with mutual mistrust, lack of communication, and widespread stereotyping? Are we really faced with the process described by a scientist as 'a clash of civilisations' "? There can be different answers to these questions, but all are focused around some common issues: let us briefly examine them, using the Maghreb as a frame of reference. Is there one Islam, or many? The trend in the West is to have a uniform, nearly monolithic image of Islam. Such an image is also fostered by the myths which have travelled across the Muslim world: pan-Arabism, the Great Arab Nation, the Community (umma) of Believers -- notions which are now coming back under new guises, such as the Islamic International, and so forth. In fact, this is not the way things stand. First of all, the religious history of Muslim countries has experienced many controversies (often leading to confrontation) between different schools of thought, for one the major split between Sunnis and Shiites. In this context, one can identify a wide range of religious approaches which are not very different from their Christian equivalents -- from the "mysticism" of Sufi tradition to theological rationalism, from calls to the original spirit of Islam to strict formalistic interpretations of the law... And, more than that, the political history of these nations has indeed experienced many conflicts and tensions. The history of the Maghreb is indeed the clearest example of this. Solidarity among Maghrebi nationalists during the independence war was followed by growing tension between the various states, which took diverging positions in the international scenario of the Cold War. Therefore, it took the fall of the Berlin Wall before the nations of the Maghreb began discussing among themselves a serious process of regional convergence and cooperation, and they still have a long way to go. Ideological, political and military conflicts (particularly the dispute between Algeria and Morocco over the Sahara) have led to an almost complete lack of economic relations among them. In the late '80s, commercial relations among the countries of the Maghreb were virtually non-existent, and accounted for less than 11 per cent of the foreign trade of each country. The clearest example of this is given by Algerian hydrocarbon products, all exported to Europe. Something has been changing, however. In 1989, a historical meeting was held in Marrakech, leading to the establishment of the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM). So far, however, results have not been very brilliant. As written by a Tunisian economist, "The peoples of the Maghreb ignore one another, while their societies are affected by the same processes of deep social change (urbanisation, lower birth rates, more secular and individualistic behaviour...). Such lack of cooperation can mainly be ascribed to two factors: the dispute over the Sahara and the civil war in Algeria, which have heavily undermined the relations between Algeria and the rest of the region. But widespread Western ignorance concerns something more than the ability to discern different schools of thought, or historical conflicts such as that between Sunnis and Shiites. A gross example of such ignorance is the widespread tendency to equate Islam and the Arab world. Yet, not only the country with the largest Muslim population in the world is Indonesia, but the majority of peoples whose religion is Islam are not at all Arabs. History has produced an Indian Islam, a Persian Islam, a Balkan Islam, and nowadays... a Western European Islam. Social and political Islamist movements, too, are characterised by a wide range of diverse views and include not only Arab theoreticians, but also Pakistani, Malay and of course Persian thinkers. A lot of emphasis has been placed on the "Holy War", on Arab militias in Afghanistan, on the Islamic International as the International of Terror, but anyone even minimally acquainted with Middle East societies would be aware of the tensions between Arabs and Persians-Iranians, and of how basically alien are Central Asians to them. Nor should we forget that one of the bloodiest wars in the second half of the 20th century was the conflict between Iran and Iraq. And yet, for political reasons, a uniform and stereotyped image of Islam is still what the West prefers to see. In the eyes of Western public opinion (and in Russia and Eastern Europe as well), Islam is often equated with intolerance, and Islamism with violence and terror. Of course, such an image has been nurtured by specific, concrete events; it is not merely the fruit of manipulation and propaganda. But why has it become such a reductionist stereotype? What lies behind the stereotype Many Muslim intellectuals believe that this lopsided view of Islam is basically the result of three factors: 1) The first dates way back before modern times in European history, in the Middle Ages, when Islam was perceived as an expansionist religion. Indeed, the battle of Lepanto is still celebrated today, and we all know the myths which were developed in the Balkans around the 1389 battle of Kosovo. In the mental landscape of Europeans, Saracens are imagined as violent conquerors. In the Arab world, of course, roles are reversed: it is the Crusaders who are remembered as bloody predators, while the men perceived by Europe as dictators and torturers -- such as Saladdin or Suleiman -- are remembered as noble heroes, great princes and leaders. Hence, it stands to reason that Bin Laden intends to fight against the Crusaders, while President Bush intends to launch a new Crusade! 2) The second factor is the legacy of colonialism, when anyone resisting against French or British rule was treated as a "terrorist". Nothing new. For Milosevic, all Kosovo Albanians were terrorists, and -- as a young Tunisian once said to me laughingly -- "for Sharon all Palestinian nationalists are terrorists (forgetting the experience of Zionist terrorism), and so are all Chechens, according to Mr Putin." A French intellectual, and a real expert in Maghrebi affairs, once summed up this kind of attitude towards Islam with the following words: "The association between Islam and terrorism is strongly linked to an ideological construct. In France, there is something more than that, rooted in our colonialist past, and more specifically to the Algerian experience. Remember the comments by certain sectors of the press, who wrote about 'those butchers' of the National Liberation Front. This kind of colonialist past still has some influence." 3) The third factor emerged after decolonisation, which in many countries was followed by the rise of heavily centralised and authoritarian regimes. Liberation wars led to the "militarisation" of politics and the repression of any dissent. These harsh regimes, and the failure of their projects of modernisation from above, are among the causes of the rise of violent Islamist groups. Nasser's jails in Egypt, or the prisons of the Baath state in Syria, have fostered the growth of some of the most extreme and violent Islamist factions. Reading the biographies of the theoreticians of Islamist radicalism, one can see that repression, imprisonment, torture played a key role in the violent course chosen by such fringe groups, and one can also see how they were instrumental to those authoritarian governments, who actually made use of them to consolidate their rule. Finally, the Cold War irrevocably marked the end of a myth: pan-Arabism. Entrenchment of identity There is one further hurdle, the so-called "entrenchment of identity". Indeed, one of the effects of globalisation has been the emergence of identity-based movements. An American academic, Professor B. Barber, in his book, "Jihad versus McWorld", has developed an interesting theory. In his view, the expansion of the McWorld, symbol of cultural homogenising all over the world, breeds a parallel and proportional mechanism of self-defence in the local populations, who feel their culture threatened by internationalisation. It is a global phenomenon, affecting each and every continent. In Europe, we have even witnessed the birth of xenophobic organisations (such as the Northern League in Italy, Haider's movement in Austria, or xenophobic right-wing extremists in Flanders) based on self-fabricated identities, and on the idea that all Others, those who are different from Us, are the enemy. In many countries religion is a strong component of people's identity. This is true not only in the Muslim world, where religion has a primary role in society, but also in highly secularised societies, such as former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union. One could not say, however, that religion is at the root of conflicts which are in fact caused by economic, social and political factors, though they are clothed as religious and identity-based. Of course, religion can play an important role in what British historian Hobsbawm has defined as "the construction of national identity". Nationalism is the product of a policy; the educational system, the army, the intellectuals, all jointly concur to its construction. This is true particularly for those states whose frontiers were established by the great Powers after the fall of vast inter-ethnic empires such as the Ottoman Empire. Even today, North Africa is still thick with border disputes. So religion can be used as a strong element of national identity, as well as for political purposes. As recalled by Tarik Ramadan, an Egyptian intellectual living in Geneva: "We should refrain from jumping to conclusions: it is not religions that have a problem with power, or with violence, it is simply human beings. And Muslim intellectuals should be very clear about the use of violence." Undoubtedly, however, religion does carry an enormous weight in Muslim societies. That is why some social scientists have developed obsolete notions such as "the pious middle classes", or have assimilated some of the notions used by Islamist radicals to the language of Western political vocabulary. Such a relevance of religious experience makes Muslim societies difficult to understand for a Westerner. Furthermore, some references and concepts can easily be instrumentalised, a typical example being the notion of Jihad, inaccurately translated as Holy War. Following the advice of Arab friends, I read the publications of some Sufi brotherhoods (the mystical trend within Islam), heavily criticised by fundamentalists. Well, for them, Jihad meant spiritual quest, striving for self-improvement, against the negative forces which inhabit every one of us, and taking action to achieve social justice. It is commonly believed in the West that Muslim societies should become more secularised, and that the mingling between religion and politics is the prime cause of all their problems. There are many different views about this issue. Some acknowledge that the greatest challenge is to establish the independence of politics from religion, while others count on Islamic values as the best way to bring about an open and pluralistic society. "Secularism -- they say -- is not a universal model. Even in Europe, different notions of secularism are found in the various countries, according to their history, and to their philosophical and religious traditions. In the Muslim world, secularism has been used by some countries -- such as Syria, and particularly Iraq -- as the foundation of their repressive policies. The only universal criteria are universal values, and not models of society, which can indeed vary. Secularism cannot be forced upon a society by order of law, whereas policies inspired by the values of justice and freedom, which are at the heart of Islam, can and should be pursued. Justice matters more than a spirit of belonging, and the meeting point among all of us should be the respect for fundamental human rights." A shared challenge On the basis of such shared values, we should then search for a common route to follow in the maze of globalisation, in a spirit of respect towards each and every different culture. The perspective of a united Maghreb associated to the European Union not only through trade and economics, but also politically and socially, is the only valid perspective for the region. It requires the existence of open, pluralistic societies, where civil society, and first and foremost labour and employers' organisations, play an active role. In this perspective, the battle for the respect of democratic freedoms and labour rights, and against any form of fundamentalism, is a common front involving both shores of the Mediterranean. Before the summer, the IMF will organise a sub-regional conference for its affiliates in North Africa, to discuss regional objectives and action plans. The first objective is to promote educational and training initiatives at regional level, in cooperation with European trade unions. The second objective is to develop dialogue, to foster better mutual understanding, to set aside, as I said above, any stereotype or schematic perception. To this end, a major contribution can be made by the many trade union activists from the Maghreb who are actively engaged in the French and Spanish unions. On the "Western" side, on the other hand, growing efforts are needed to look at the complex reality of the Arab world with different eyes, leaving behind those Euro-centric attitudes which to some extent are found in the trade unions as well, with a view to building the alliance between North and South which is needed for a new world order to come about. The fundamentalist danger can be defeated mostly through such means.